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COULD GOD HAVE MORE THAN ONE NATURE?
Robert McKim

Abstract. I begin by examining John Hick's view of the status of the claims of the major
world religions about what he calls "the Real," in particulat his view of the status of the
theistic claim that the Real is personal, and of the nontheistic claim that the Real is not personaL I distinguish Moderate Pluralism, the view that different conceptions of the Real ate
conceptions of the same thing, from Radical Pluralism, the view that different conceptions
all accurately describe the Real. Although there is a bit of uncertainty about this, Hick seems
to espouse a version of Moderate Pluralism, a version which I call Noumenal Pluralism.
Moderate Pluralism is a coherent view, but Radical Pluralism is not coherent, and the standatd defenses of it ate not convincing. However, the view that the Real has more than one
nature, a view which preserves much of Radical Pluralism, seems to be coherent.

1. The Religious Reality. Most members of most religious traditions believe there
is a being, or entity, or state which is supremely important. Theists generally contend that there is a superior being who is benevolent, merciful, and just. Some
speak of Yahweh, some of God the Father of Jesus Christ, and some of Allah. I use
the term "God" to refer to the superior being whom theists believe to exist, although
I do not assume that theists all believe in the same deity. Theists clearly disagree
about the nature and activities of God, but they agree that God acts, responds to
prayers, rewards, punishes, forgives, cares for people, perceives, knows, makes
moral judgments, and is personal in these and other respects.' I refer to someone
who holds these beliefs about God as a personalist.
Some nontheistic religions say there is a being, or entity, or state which is
supremely important, but which is not personal. Advaita Vedantists, for instance,
say there is an Absolute which is not personal. The Absolute is changeless, ineffable, and eternal, and it does not act, does not perceive, reward, forgive, and
so on. The Buddhist conception of Nirvana is also a conception of something which
is thought to be of supreme importance, but not to be personal. I refer to someone
who believes there to be a supremely important impersonal force or state as an
impersonalist.
So personalists and impersonalists agree that there is something which is
supremely important. I refer to this "something" as the Religious Reality (RR),
although I do not assume that personalists and impersonalists concern themselves
with the same RR. The RR, to borrow from Professor Hick, is "a limitlessly greater
and higher Reality beyond or within us, in relation to which or to whom is our
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highest good." (Problems of Religious Pluralism (PRP) (London: MacMillan,
1985), 39) The theistic traditions have non-theistic variants, and in a tradition such
as Hinduism one finds personal deities and personal conceptions of the Absolute
as well as the impersonal conception. So it is not so easy to draw the battlelines
between the traditions on this issue. Yet there can be no doubt that there is
disagreement about whether or not the RR is personal. It seems that if the
impersonalists are right about the RR, the personalists are wrong, and vice versa.
2. Hick's View. In some of his writings John Hick appears to disagree. The
world religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism
are "vast historical complexes ... within [which] ... the Real, the Ultimate,
the Divine is known and responded to ... " ("On Grading Religions" (GR)
Religious Studies, 17, 1981, 467)2
[We must distinguish] the Real an sich (in his/her/itself) and the Real
as humanly thought and experienced .... [We] are always aware of
reality beyond ourselves in terms of the sets of concepts which structure
our own cognitive consciousness. And the different religious traditions,
with their different conceptual systems ... constitute the 'lenses'
through which different faith-communities variously perceive the divine
Reality. The two basic concepts which are central to the different forms
of religious experience are the concept of deity, or of the Real as
personal, and the concept of the absolute, or of the Real as non-personal.
These take particular concrete forms at different human interfaces with
the divine, as the divine personae (Jahweh, Shiva, Vishnu, the Heavenly
Father, the Qur'anic Revealer ... ) and the divine impersonae
(Brahman, the Tao, Nirvana, Sunyata, the Dharmakaya .... ) ("On
Conflicting Religious Truth-Claims" (CRT) Religious Studies, 19,488)
Different conceptions of the RR are "different divine phenomena in terms of
which the one divine noumenon is humanly experienced." (PRP, 42) "If
we . . . ask ourselves how it can be that the same ultimate divine Reality can
be perceived in such different ways ... the answer must involve both the infinity
of the divine Reality, transcending all our conceptualizations, and the historical
variety of the human cultures which form the lenses through which the Reality
is variously perceived." (CRT, 489)
Hick's view seems to be that there is the RR as it is in itself, and there are
both personal and impersonal conceptions of it. To put it crudely, he distinguishes
three things, the relation between which he explores: the RR as it is in itself,
the RR as conceived of by personalists, and the RR as conceived of by impersonalists. Hick holds that different traditions, including both personalist and
impersonalist traditions, know, respond to, perceive, have conceptions of, (etc.)
the same RR, even though they characterize it in different ways. I refer to this
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view as "Moderate Pluralism." Moderate Pluralism is distinct from what I call
"Radical Pluralism": this is the view that the various competing accounts of the
RR are all true. According to Radical Pluralism what appear to be incompatible
claims about the RR actually are compatible. So Radical Pluralism, in addition
to saying that in different traditions the same RR is known (responded to,
perceived, conceived of, etc.), says that the competing conceptions of the RR
are all accurate.
What sort of Pluralist-Moderate or Radical-is Hick? He says that "the same
ultimate divine Reality can be perceived in such different ways from within the
different religions." (CRT, 489) He writes of the authenticity of different faiths.
"[The] Real is equally authentically thought and experienced as personal and as
non-personal." (PRP, 98) Such remarks have the flavor of Radical Pluralism
about them, but they may mean merely that members of the different traditions
are genuinely in contact with the RR and that there is equally significant or
meaningful reflection about the RR in the different traditions, all of which
amounts to a statement of Moderate Pluralism. He makes other remarks which
are suggestive of Moderate Pluralism, including his claim that "all human experience is experience-as." The idea is just that human experience involves a measure
of interpretation: it involves the use of conceptual and interpretive schemes. (He
mentions a number of types of interpretation which we impose on our experience,
such as the type of interpretation that is involved in seeing physical objects as
objects of a particular type, such as chairs, tables, knives, forks, and so on,
(PRP, 20) and religious interpretations, such as the interpretation of an illness
as divine punishment.) Interpretation is involved in experience of the RR: "if
we ask why it is that Christians, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, report such
different perceptions of the divine, the answer that suggests itself is that they
are operating with different sets of religious concepts in terms of which they
experience in characteristically different ways." (PRP, 26) The view that there
are different "lenses" or perspectives, different categorial schemes, through which
we perceive the RR, would account for disagreements about its nature, but does
not take us beyond Moderate Pluralism. The fact that different groups have
different perspectives would account for the central feature of Moderate Pluralism,
namely that different groups say very different things about, and have very
different conceptions of, the same RR.3 But some of Hick's remarks definitely
seem to suggest that the RR is accurately, equally accurately, portrayed within
the different traditions. For instance, he writes that "[the] Eternal may be-and
has in fact been experienced as being-personal ... without this genuinely
personal character exhausting its infinity, so that the same Reality may also
be-and has in fact been experienced as being-... [impersonal] .... " (Death
and Eternal Life (Harper & Row, 1976), 32, my emphasis) He also says that
among primitive peoples the "divine reality" was "crudely apprehended as a
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plurality of quasi-animal forces"; such people had an "inchoate sense of the
divine." ("The Outcome: Dialogue into Truth" in Truth and Dialogue ed. John
Hick, (London: Sheldon Press, 1974) 149/50) "[Once] the golden age of religious
creativity dawned ... sometime after 1000 B.C. ... a series of revelatory
experiences [occurred] ... throughout the world [and] ... deepened and
purified men's conceptions of the divine." (Ibid., 150) So there are accurate and
inaccurate representations of the "divine reality"; the suggestion appears to be
that the dominant world religions, unlike the religions of "primitive people,"
have an accurate picture of the RR.
There can be no doubt that there are suggestions of Radical Pluralism in Hick's
work. But it is striking that many of his relevant remarks are ambiguous: indeed
there is almost a systematic ambiguity in the relevant passages. Consider, for
instance, this passage:
"[The] Real can be experienced both in terms of the concept of deity
and in terms of the concept of the absolute .... There is, I think, an
illuminating analogy here with the use of the complementarity principle
in relation to electromagnetic radiations. When light is experimented
upon in a certain way it exhibits wave-like properties, and when
experimented on in another way, particle-like properties. We have to
say that in itself, independently of interaction with human observrrs, it
is such as to be capable of being experienced under different experimental
conditions in these different ways. Analogously ... [through] dualisticpersonalist lenses the real is seen and responded to as personal; through
monistic lenses, as non-personal. And so we postulate the Real an sich,
concerning which we have to say that it is capable of being authentically
thought and experienced by human beings in these two significantly
different ways; .... " (PRP, 98-9)
Such remarks could be read as a statement of Moderate Pluralism or as a statement
of Radical Pluralism. The claims that the "Real" can be, or is capable of being,
experienced in both ways, and is capable of being authentically experienced in
both ways, are ambiguous in this respect. The light analogy may suggest Radical
Pluralism, although certainly not unequivocally.
Recently Hick has said that he is a Moderate rather than a Radical Pluralist,
although he says that this has not been clear in some of his writings. He says
he is not a Radical Pluralist because he denies that the RR in itself is accurately
described by either personalists or impersonalists.
[The] RR is neither experienced nor thought as it is in itself. The
concepts which apply to its manifestations (the personae and impersonae) do not apply to the RR an sich. We cannot say that it is personal
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or non-personal, good or bad.
. The point of the complementarity
analogy drawn from physics was meant to be that, as we can only
characterise light as waves or particles, in its relation to an observer
who acts upon it in a certain way, so we can only characterise the [RR]
... as it is in relation to faith communities (and individuals) who 'act'
upon it in personalistic worship or impersonalistic meditation. 4

So Radical Pluralism has no chance of being true: it requires that the RR an sich
should correctly be described as both personal and impersonal, but it can correctly
be described in neither way. In fact we can say almost nothing about it, it seems.
The claims that different groups make are true of their conception of the RR but
not of the RR itself. For the most part, claims which are true about Allah, for
example, are true of the Islamic conception of Allah, but not of the RR as it is
in itself. 5 On this view the RR as it is in itself is almost entirely unknowable.
All we know of it is that it is capable of being experienced by different groups
in various different ways. It has features such that in interaction with different
groups it is seen by them in these ways. There is something in the RR corresponding to the characteristics that we impute to it, even if we do not know
what it is. Let us call this view Noumenal Pluralism. 6
Noumenal Pluralism is a version of Moderate Pluralism since it implies that
the different traditions have contact with the same RR, although they characterise
it in different ways, but it denies the Radical Pluralist claim that these characterisations are true of the RR an sich. Noumenal Pluralism does not merely say that
what a particular faith community says about the RR is influenced very considerably by the nature of that group's interaction with the RR. For characterising
something "in relation to an observer who acts upon it in a certain way" need
not be thought to be tantamount to not describing it "as it is in itself." We can
characterise something as it is in itself, at least in part, by giving an account of
its relation to other things, including observers. One could hold that when the
RR is characterised "in relation to faith communities," we can learn something
about the RR as it is in itself. The view that what a particular faith community
says about the RR is influenced very considerably by the nature of that group's
interaction with the RR is, therefore, consistent with either Moderate or Radical
Pluralism: it will be a version of Radical Pluralism if the apparently incompatible
characterisations are all said to be true of the RR as it is in itself, and it will be
a version of Moderate Pluralism if this is denied.
My main concern in this paper is with the plausibility of Radical Pluralism,
but a comment or two on the merits of Noumenal Pluralism is in order. One
wonders what is Hick's argument for the Noumenal Pluralist claim that none of
the faith communities give anything remotely like an accurate account of the
RR, and that our concepts do not even apply to the RR an sich. 6 As far as I
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know, Hick has no argument to show that such concepts do not apply. Perhaps
he should embrace the weaker view that we have no way of telling whether or
not any of our concepts so apply, or the yet weaker view that we have no way
of telling which concepts among those used by diverse faith communities should
figure in a correct description of the RR an sich. Another question is this. If
none of our concepts apply to the RR an sich, what is the justification for
assuming that only a tradition which is salvifically effective--i.e., which helps
with transformation of character-should be regarded as having a conception of
the RR which is a product of genuine interaction between the RR and a faith
communityT Perhaps some conceptions which have a place in traditions which
are salvifically effective are nothing but human creations: the sort of thing that
those who argue that some religious beliefs are nothing but human projections
comes to mind as a way of explaining how such conceptions might be created.
Or perhaps some conceptions which have a place in traditions which are not
salvifically effective are products of genuine interaction between the RR and
faith communities. It is hard to see why one should go one way rather than
another on these matters once one assumes the virtually complete unknowability
of the RR an sich. Things would be otherwise if, say, we had reason to think
the RR an sich is, or even might be, good or benevolent, or interested in
transformation of human character: in that case we might have reason to think
that a tradition which fosters the transformation of human character involves a
conception of the RR which is a product of interaction between the RR and a
faith community.
We should note too the very high price that members of the various faith
communities must pay if they are to be Noumenal Pluralists. I will look at it
from a personalist point of view, by way of illustration. Personalists believe that
God acts, responds to prayers, rewards, punishes, forgives, cares for people,
perceives, knows, makes moral judgments, and so forth. On the Noumenal
Pluralist view there is no entity to whom such activities and states may truly be
imputed. Certainly they cannot be truly imputed to the RR an sich, for they
cannot be imputed to the RR an sich at all. But on the other hand to impute
them to a particular conception or image of the RR is, it seems, to impute them
to something which has no existence external to the minds of the members of
the relevant faith community. The Noumenal Pluralist view is that these conceptions provide for genuine access to the RR in itself, and are the products of
genuine interaction with the RR, but there is no suggestion that entities corresponding to these conceptions exists, side by side as it were, in addition to the
RR in itself. The Noumenal Pluralist answer to the question "Is there a supernatural or transcendent being external to us which acts, responds to prayers,
rewards, punishes, forgives, and cares for people?" appears to be "no."8 Radical
Pluralism, therefore, is actually more attractive from, say, the theistic point of
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view, because it attempts to defend the claim that the RR an sich is benevolent,
acts, knows, and so forth. Whether or not it can coherently do so, of course, is
another question.
3. Moderate Pluralism. It is easy to think of cases in ordinary experience in
which there are different, even incompatible, conceptions of some thing or being
as a result of the fact that different conceptual schemes, or even just different
ways of looking at things, are operative. Access to different information may
also play some role in the formation of different and incompatible conceptions
of a thing or being. Suppose your neighbor Harry, admired by neighbors on
account of his apparent friendliness and generosity, is really a vicious hoodlum
who steals out at night to commit his crimes. Those who talk of the fine neighbor
and those who talk of the hoodlum are talking about the same individual. There
are incompatible conceptions of the same individual in virtue of the fact that
different people have different information about him.
How different can conceptions of something be? A full answer to this question
would require the spelling out of a theory of reference. Here I will just make a
remark or two. Someone who has an entirely mistaken picture of Harry's nature
can still be talking about Harry. But the picture must connect up in the right
way with Harry. One account of what connecting up in the right way amounts
to requires that the picture must have been caused in an appropriate way if it is
to be a picture of Harry. If you and I have entirely different encounters with
Harry-you, let us suppose, narrowly escape one of his assaults, while I know
him as an apparently friendly neighbor-then no doubt we will form very different
conceptions of Harry, and yet they can both be conceptions of Harry in virtue
of the fact that they have been caused in a certain way, namely through interaction
with Harry. Likewise in the case of the RR: a condition which Hick believes to
obtain, namely that the different conceptions of the different traditions are all
caused by the same entity, would ensure that the same RR is being variously
construed. "[All] authentic religious awareness is a response to the circumambient
presence and prevenient pressure of the divine Reality .... (PRP, 97/8) . . . . .
[There] has been a genuine impact of transcendent divine Reality upon human
life." (PRP, 103; also 106) There are, of course, other theories of reference but
I will not comment on them here: it is clear that there are plausible theories of
reference which are compatible with Moderate Pluralism.
There are various versions of Moderate Pluralism. All versions distinguish the
RR as it is in itself from the various conceptions of it. But they can disagree
about many things, including the nature of the RR, how much we can say about
it, and the precise nature of the relations which obtain between the RR and the
various conceptions of it. Versions of Moderate Pluralism can vary, for example,
with respect to the extent to which they think the RR to be incomprehensible.
Some may hold that no human conception could describe it accurately and the
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best we can do is strive to point in its direction: the RR is sufficiently mysterious,
sufficiently far beyond our comprehension, that we can say little or nothing with
confidence about it. Noumenal Pluralism is one such view. If this were so, it
would not be surprising if descriptions mistakenly taken at their face value
appeared to be incompatible. Others may hold that although the available conceptions do not accurately describe the RR, the RR is not in principle incomprehensible. Yet others may hold that some conception or conceptions-and here their
own conception is likely to figure prominently-more accurately describe the
RR than others. Versions of Moderate Pluralism can also vary with respect to
their view of what causes there to be different conceptions of the RR. The
competing conceptions of the RR may be thought to be caused or produced by
the RR itself, or to be produced by the communities or groups whose conceptions
they are, or to be produced by some other factor, or by some combination of
factors. Versions of Moderate Pluralism can vary too with respect to their account
of what, if anything, in the RR produces the different conceptions. And versions
of Moderate Pluralism can differ about the extent to which they think it possible
to reconcile the different conceptions: some Moderate Pluralists will look for a
way to combine what they think to be best from the various conceptions, perhaps
believing that in doing so they are peeling away inessentials, and attempt to
construct one consistent conception, while others will eschew such an approach.
No doubt there are further ways in which we might divide up versions of Moderate
Pluralism. In any case it seems clear that Moderate Pluralism is a coherent view.
I will not raise here the question of whether or not it is true. 9
4. Radical Pluralism: Some Unconvincing Moves. Now let us consider Radical
Pluralism, the view that the competing conceptions of the RR are all true, that
what seem incompatible conceptions of the RR are actually compatible. Such a
view, if widely espoused, probably would promote mutual respect among members of different traditions. For this reason it is very attractive. But is it plausible?
Is it even coherent: is there a view here to espouse?
First, some clarification. I assume that the nature of the RR does not change.
If the RR changes, it has different characteristics at different times, although
whether or not that would help with a defense of Radical Pluralism is another
matter. I obviously assume too that it is possible to think about, and to some
extent describe, the RR. Personalists and impersonalists think the RR to be very
different from all other things, but not so different from everything else that we
can say nothing about it. If we were entirely unable to describe it, then all
attempted descriptions of it would, presumably, be equally false. Worse, we
might have no business talking about it as being unintelligible: we might have
no way to determine the reference of discourse which purports to be about it.
So those who say that there is an RR should be committed to our being able to
think about it, however metaphorical or analogical may be the usage of our
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concepts when we refer to it, and however inadequate and faltering may be our
grasp of it. It seems plain that once concepts are used, then if they are to convey
information they must be used in such a way that, for instance, if the RR is
being claimed to be benevolent, then it is also being claimed that the RR is not
malevolent, not indifferent, and so on.
In discussing Radical Pluralism I take both realism and a correspondence
theory of truth for granted. By "realism" I mean the view that there is a reality
external to us which has its own nature quite apart from our interaction with it.
I assume the RR has a nature which is not a product of our interaction with it,
and which exists independent of the perceptions or states of any being other than
the RR. A denial of realism can take a number of forms. One might be a relativist
about truth or a conceptual relativist, holding that what is true or what exists is
relative to, for example, categorial frameworks or conceptual schemes, and that
talk of the RR as it is in itself is meaningless or pointless. I will have nothing
to say about relativism in any of its forms here. 10
How might Radical Pluralism be defended? I consider a number of attempted
defenses, moving from the unpromising to the more promising. If the aim is to
defend Radical Pluralism there obviously is no point in merely contending that
although the descriptions of the RR in the various traditions are not all true,
what really matters about the RR from a human point of view, or from some
other important point of view, is captured by all of the conceptions. Nor is
Radical Pluralism supported by the observation that there are descriptions which
are satisfied by the RR, under all or many of the distinct conceptions of it. Allah
and Brahman, when Brahman is conceived of non-personally, and indeed the
RR as it is conceived of in all the traditions, would probably satisfy the following
description: "it is of supreme importance, holy, beyond space and time, a source
of human fulfillment, and distinct from all physical things." But this does not
show, or even suggest, that the apparently incompatible claims made about the
RR are all true.
Nor should we be persuaded by the arguments of J. Kellenberger. (,The
Slippery Slope of Religious Relativism" Religious Studies 20, 1984, 39-51)
Kellenberger's case seems at first glance to be offered in support of something
like Radical Pluralism, for this author suggests that "it may be that each major
religion provides an equally good guide to the nature of God .... (47) and that
it is not the case "that if we accept ... that God is uniquely revealed in Jesus
we must deny that He is uniquely revealed in the prophets ofIsrael, in Krishna,
and in the Buddha." (46) But Kellenberger thinks that it may also be that "the
central beliefs of one religion [about God], and not those of others, are true."
(Ibid.) This looks like a step in the direction of accepting Radical Pluralism,
followed by a step in the direction of rejecting it. But what is going on here is
just that the notion of "having a guide to the nature of God" has been reduced
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to "working out ... in fear and trembling ... a day-to-day lived relationship
with God or Reality." Gi ven that people in different traditions succeed in working
out such a relationship--something which, Kellenberger makes clear, does not
require them to have a true account of the Reality in question-then we get the
result that each tradition has "an equally good guide to the nature of God." But
we get this result in such a form that it has been emptied of its normal content.
Consider next Hick's soteriological test for the accuracy of the claims of a
tradition. According to Hick "there must be a strong correlation between the
authenticity of the forms of religious experience and their spiritual and moral
fruits." (PRP, 38) A person's "spiritual state, or existential condition ... [can
range] from the negative response of a self-enclosed consciousness which is
blind to the divine presence ... to a positive openness to the Divine which
gradually transforms us and which is called salvation or liberation or enlightenment. This transformation is essentially the same within the different religious
contexts within which it occurs: I would define it formally as the transformation
of human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness." (PRP, 29)
When this transformation occurs, there is authentic religious experience. Salvation consists in this transformation, and since we can have a good idea of whether
or not this process of transformation is occurring, we can also have a good idea
of where and to what extent salvation is occurring. It is occurring "so far as
observation can tell, to much the same extent . . . [in the J great world faiths."
(PRP, 36, also 47.)" So we may infer that the different perceptions of the RR
which those faiths embody are "authentic" and "valid." (PRP, 44) "lIn] fact the
truth-claim and the salvation-claim cohere closely together and should be treated
as a single package." (PRP, 46) But this is not very convincing. Suppose that
personal transformation of the sort Hick has in mind occurs in all the major
traditions. Why should this fact give us reason to think that the different accounts
of the RR involved in the traditions are all true? Perhaps the truth of one or
another version of Moderate Pluralism is all that is indicated by the widespread
occurrence of personal transformation: perhaps getting in touch with the RR
rather than accurately depicting it is sufficient for the transformation in question.
Or nothing of this sort may be indicated at all. If Hick is wrong about salvation
consisting in a transformation of the sort he describes, and if salvation consists
in something else, such as forgiveness of sins and reconciliation with God, as
these are understood by Calvinists, or in liberation from rebirth, as this is understood by Hindus, there is still no reason to think salvation and truth should be
"treated as a single package." Let us call the view that the dominant traditions
are equally salvifically effective-that is, are equally viable paths to salvationSalvific Pluralism. One can be a Salvific Pluralist without being a Radical
Pluralist, just as one can be a Radical Pluralist without being a Salvific Pluralist,
although the latter view would be surprising. And needless to say, profound
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personal transformations of the sort Hick has in mind sometimes occur in the
absence of any religious commitments. A test for truth is not to be found in this
area. 12
Then there are appeals to the infinity of the RR in support of Radical Pluralism.
For example, Chubb writes as follows:
to affirm a predicate of a finite being is necessarily to exclude some
other predicate which is the contrary ... ofthe predicate affirmed. The
capacity to accommodate a predicate only through the exclusion of
another predicate belonging to the same universe of discourse is the
mark of finite existence. The finite lives by exclusion. The infinite,
however, suffers no such limitation. Its acceptance of a predicate ... does not involve a denial of any predicate except the contradictory of the predicate affirmed. Thus there is no contradiction in saying
that God is both personal and impersonal. To say that God is the supreme
person logically involves the denial of the proposition 'God is not the
Supreme Person. ' It does not involve the further denial of the proposition
'God is formless and impersonal.' ("Presuppositions of Religious
Dialogue," Religious Studies 8, 1972, 296-7)
This seems to be a statement of Radical Pluralism which, like some of Hick's
comments, emphasizes the infinity of the RR. Some years ago Hick wrote that
"[in] a finite entity, personality and impersonality are mutually incompatible.
But why should they be incompatible in the Infinite?" (Death and Eternal Life,
32.)

Chubb, who indicates that he follows Sri Auribindo at this point, contends
that "the infinite is such that when we attribute some property to it, the contradictory of the predicate in question is being denied to apply to it, but the contraries
of that predicate are not being denied to apply." Chubb claims that if one holds
that God is personal then one may also hold without inconsistency that God is
impersonal, although one may not hold that God is not a person. In thinking
about Chubb's point here, it is important to note that he takes the property of
being a person and the property of being personal to be the same property. (I
comment on this in n. 1 below.) But--contrary to what Chubb says-when the
Absolute is said to be impersonal, part of what seems to be meant is that the
Absolute is not-in Chubb's terms-a person. It is true that there are usages of
the term "impersonal" which do not have this implication: for instance, when a
person, or more likely a person's style or behavior, are said to be impersonal,
what is meant is that the person has a particular sort of character, and not that
she is not a person. But this is quite beside the point. When the RR is said to
be impersonal, this is not what is meant. Among the things that I take to be
implied when the RR is said to be impersonal is that the RR does not act, respond
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to prayers, reward, punish, forgive, care for people, perceive, know, make moral
judgments, and so on. But this is just to deny that the RR is personal. Examples
can be multiplied. Chubb thinks that the RR's being benevolent excludes it's
not being benevolent, but not it's being, say, indifferent or selfish. But an
indifferent being, or a selfish being, is one which is not benevolent. If something
is indifferent, it is not benevolent. The distinction between contraries and contradictories is of no help here. (Incidentally, if it were meaningful to claim that
in the case of an infinite being, the contradictory, but not the contraries, of a
predicate affirmed of it, is being denied, we might wonder why the normal usage
of our concepts breaks down just to this extent. Huston Smith seems to go all
the way when he remarks in writing about Hinduism that "logic itself may melt
in the full blast of the divine incandescence." The Religions of Man, (New York:
Harper & Row, 1958,66»
I already mentioned the view that there are different "lenses" or perspectives,
different categorial schemes, through which we perceive the RR. While this
would explain disagreements about the nature of the RR, it does not render
Radical Pluralism plausible. Only if the RR itself has aspects or parts which the
various lenses render perceivable, can the competing descriptions of the RR all
be true. Only if the RR has a nature such that it can correctly be characterised
in the ways in which it is variously interpreted, can Radical Pluralism be correct.
I now tum to that more promising possibility.
5. A Step in the Direction of Radical Pluralism. Defenders of Radical Pluralism
sometimes observe that there are cases in which apparently incompatible descriptions of things are accurate. For example, there are ambiguous diagrams such
as lastrow's duck-rabbit. This is a drawing which lends itself to being seen either
as a drawing of a duck or as a drawing of a rabbit. It is not merely that the
drawing can be seen as that of a duck and as that of a rabbit. It has a drawing-of-aduck aspect and a drawing-of-a-rabbit aspect. We need to distinguish cases where
something merely is such that it can be seen in a number of ways from cases
where something can be seen in a number of ways and has a complexity such
that it can correctly be seen in those ways. The cases which are relevant to the
defense of Radical Pluralism are the latter cases, those in which what is observed
has aspects such that more than one interpretation of it is true. Radical Pluralism
requires that the RR can correctly be interpreted in different ways.
Another familiar illustration goes like this. Seven blind men-seven blind
men with no previous experience of elephants-are asked to describe an elephant.
One feels only the tail and says "it feels like a rope," another only a leg and
says "it feels like a tree-trunk," and so on. Defenders of Radical Pluralism
sometimes point out that what each of the blind men says about the elephant is
true, even though their descriptions are very different. The descriptions of the
elephant are compatible: something can feel like a rope and feel like a tree-trunk
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if it has different parts, at least one of which feels like a rope and at least one
of which feels like a tree-trunk.
Could the RR have parts too? Only if the RR has aspects or parts which the
various lenses render perceivable could the competing descriptions of it all be
accurate. A personalist is likely to allow that human knowledge of God is very
fragmentary, very incomplete. Should a personalist allow that there may be
aspects of the RR which are not personal? How could this be? We might think
of the RR as having "parts" in something like the way in which we think of a
person's personality as having parts. In this context talk of "parts" and talk of
"aspects" seem to amount to the same thing. Consider this case. A parent might
be stem with a precocious child but warm and supportive with a vulnerable
child. The parent is both stem and supportive. Which she is depends on which
child she is dealing with. The same goes for disagreements between different
personalists about the nature of God. Suppose some personalists think of God
as stem and remote and other personalists think of God as supportive and loving.
Can God be both? I see no reason why not. Which God appears to be may
depend on facts about the group with whom God is interacting. 13
Can the RR be both personal and impersonal? The commonsense view is that
it must be one or the other. If the RR is personal, perhaps you can think of it
as not being personal, and in doing so you may be aware of much that is true
of it. You may be aware of aspects of it which tend to be neglected by those
who focus on it as a personal being. There may even be something about the
RR that makes the impersonal conception of it appropriate. But if it is personal,
it can be aware, know, make moral judgments, and so forth; if you say it is not
personal, you leave all of that out and you say something false about it. Should
we take the commonsense view? I think we should, but we should also recognize
that more needs to be said.
Here is a consideration which supports the commonsense view. There is a
simple and obvious condition which must be met if our discourse is to be
informative. Consider again the claim that the RR is a benevolent being, who
wishes the best for all creatures. Benevolence in the RR would not be just like
benevolence in a human being. But however analogical or metaphorical the usage
of the term "benevolent" and its cognates in this context may be, there is a limit
to the permissible vagueness. If the claim that the RR is benevolent is to convey
any information, to have any content, it must imply that the RR is not, say,
malevolent or indifferent; for in either case the RR would not be benevolent. If
you are told that X is benevolent, but you are also told that X also is not
benevolent, you are not told anything at all. And the same goes for other properties. The death of contradiction is much quicker than the death of a thousand
qualifications.
But it is also possible that the RR has a double nature, that it has both a
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personal nature or aspect and a nature or aspect which is not personal. If this is
so, to describe either aspect is to describe the RR, although not of course in its
entirety. More than one description of the RR can be correct, and a description
which focuses on only one aspect of it is incomplete: it neglects to mention an
entire aspect of the RR. A full description would involve the use of both sorts
of descriptions.
What is it to have more than one nature? The central idea is that more than
one description with an appearance of completeness, with an appearance of
giving a full account of a being or thing, can be given. It might be objected that
this talk of two natures is unhelpful or even misleading. After all, something is
the way it is, and talk of "the way it is" is talk of its nature, however complex
or multifaceted that nature may be. Talk of something having more than one
nature, it might be suggested, should be replaced with talk of a complex nature
with more than one aspect. 14 But not much hangs on which locution we use.
Talk of something having more than one nature nicely captures the fact that
more than one description with an appearance of completeness can be given, as
well as the fact that it has properties such that it may properly be included in
one category of entities, and other properties such that it may properly be included
in another category.
That n 1 and n2 are two natures of the same thing may be something that has
to be discovered. Prior to that discovery, it may seem that if one way of describing
it is correct, the other must be incorrect. Some of the properties we impute to
it under one description may not normally be thought to be possessed by something
which can correctly be characterised under the other description. For instance,
some of the properties imputed to the RR in the course of describing its impersonal
nature may be such that when one considers an entity with those properties, one
would not normally think it to be a personal being. The impersonal nature is
such that if you were to describe that nature alone, it would appear that you
were describing a being that is not personal. But having a nature or aspect which
is not personal does not involve not being personal. It is just that the impersonal
conception accurately (if incompletely) depicts the RR without any reference to
the personal. It does not say, or imply, that the RR is not personal.
It is plausible to say that something has more than one nature only if the
properties imputed to it under the different descriptions are compatible. To impute
mutually exclusive properties to something is to say nothing about it. It is not
as though, for instance, the RR both acts in history and does not do so. If it
does so, it does so, and that is all there is to it. Rather, if it acts in history this
is a fact about it which you might not notice if you focussed on its impersonal
nature. The facts do not change on account of the way in which you look at
them, but how you look at the facts makes a difference to which of them you
see. So there are limits to what can plausibly be said to be two natures of the
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same thing, and these limits include the fact that under two descriptions of a
thing, incompatible properties cannot truly be ascribed to it. Two descriptions
can be true of something only if one does not involve a denial of any part of
the other. A more vague limit is this: the natures in question should be candidates
for coexisting. It should be sensible to impute the natures in question to the same
thing. This notion, and the larger account of the limits to what can plausibly be
said to be two natures of the same thing, is complex and a full account of it
would be major task. It is enough to point out here that there are limits of this
sort. It is easy to give examples which are within, and others which are without,
the limits, even if it is hard to state those limits.
I propose also to sidestep the question of precisely what conditions a description
must meet if it is to have an appearance of completeness. It is a description of
something about which someone might reasonably say: "that is all that is to it,
and that is all there is to know about it." (Consider a simple object such as a
knife. One can describe the knife using the terms of everyday observation or
using the terms of contemporary physics. Or consider human beings. There are
a number of ways to describe us accurately; for example, there are descriptions
using the terms of the physicist, others using the terms of the biologist, others
using the terms of the psychologist, or the theologian, and yet others using the
layperson's concepts. Someone who came across the descriptions in either case
might be very surprised to discover that they are descriptions of the same thing.
So how many natures does the knife have and how many natures do we have?
Whatever the answer to this question may be, it seems that having a double
nature has nothing to do with having an infinite nature.) While it is difficult to
specify the precise requirements a description must meet if it is to have an
appearance of completeness, it is easy to give examples of descriptions which
would not meet such requirements. ("It has a red handle" is all that is offered
as a description of the knife.) And there are descriptions for whose fulfillment
of this requirement a good case can be made. (A complete account of the
microstructure of the knife, or of our bodies, is given.) So although a full account
of what it is for a description to appear to be complete is lacking, the central
idea here, I suggest, is fairly clear.
How are we to conceive of the natures in the case of the RR? The RR qua
personal entity is something of which we can get some grasp. What about the
impersonal nature? Hindus who have an impersonal conception of the RR conceive of it as pure consciousness, pure awareness, pure bliss, and so forth (e.g.,
Huston Smith op. cit., 74). Perhaps we should think of the relation between the
two natures as follows. The difference between them might be analogous to the
difference between, on the one hand, a mind as encountered from the outside,
and on the other hand, a mind as participated in from the inside. In the latter
case, rather than interacting with something which is distinct from oneself, one
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would be participating in something that is larger than oneself. On this analysis
the RR, under both the personal and the impersonal descriptions, is thought of
as mental. Perhaps there are correct descriptions which do not characterise the
RR as mental. We are beings with a mental life of whom very elaborate descriptions can be given qua physical things. The physical is the stuff in terms of
which a description of us which does not make reference to the mental can be
given. It is possible that the RR too may correctly be described in a way that
makes reference to some other sort of stuff but makes no reference to the mental.
If the double nature theory is correct, then we and the RR share a personal
nature: that is, we are all beings of the same kind. The impersonal nature of the
RR either is unique to it, or it is shared with some other being or beings: this
is a matter about which, I suspect, we cannot speak with much confidence.
Some personalists, or some impersonalists, may not be satisfied with the
double nature proposal. A personalist will perhaps say that at the deepest level,
at the level where you are dealing with what is most important about the RR,
the RR is personal. There may be dissatisfaction with the idea that there are
characterisations of the RR which leave out entirely the fact that the RR is a
personal being and yet which are just as good as those of the personalist. But
what is it to be the more important nature of something with a double nature?
More important from what point of view? The personalist and the impersonalist
may have different views about what is more important. The personalist may
think nothing more wonderful than the discovery that interaction with the RR is
possible. The impersonalist may think the personal to be lower, inferior, limited
in some way; she may think the personal conception presumptuously
anthropomorphic. There may be no reason to think of one rather than the other
nature as more important, all things considered. Which appears more important
may be a matter of what one's priorities are. What sort of description of us you
think to be important will depend on whether it is neurology, biology, psychology,
theology, or something else you are doing. Perhaps certain cultures would be
more likely to focus on one rather than another nature of the RR.
If, say, personalists are not satisfied with the double nature proposal, is that
a serious problem? It is a reason for being suspicious of it, but not a reason to
reject it. Some personalists might say: "if it turned out that what I thought I was
worshipping was as the double nature proposal represents it, 1 would have to
conclude that the being whom I thought I was worshipping does not exist at
all." What authority should the personalist have here? Of course, a proposal
such as this might be a reasonable one even if the personalist, or anyone else,
finds it repugnant. Yet the personalist is entitled in certain circumstances to say
that, to put it crudely, if what there is to be found in the area where she thought
God to be, is very different from what she had thought, then the being whom
she thought herself to be worshipping does not exist at all. Suppose, for instance,
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that someone were to worship the RR, thinking of it as that which satisfies the
description "it is of supreme importance, holy, beyond space and time, a source
of human fulfillment, and distinct from all physical things" and also thinking
that what satisfies this description is something personal, and suppose that it
were to tum out that what satisfies the description is impersonal. There is no
reason why she must say: "ah, so it was something impersonal that I was
worshipping all along." The linguistic community, in other words, has some say
about what is essential to what is discussed. But not complete say. The double
nature proposal leaves much of the nature which the personalist had thought the
RR to have intact. Because of this the authority of the personalist is diminished.
For instance, the double nature hypothesis permits the personalist to say that the
RR is essentially personal, acts in history, perceives, makes moral judgments,
and so forth. But the double nature proposal also says that the RR has aspects
which the personalist had thought it not to have. Perhaps some personalists would
regard the double nature proposal as good news. Corresponding comments can
be made about the impersonalist.
Three final thoughts. First, a word on religious experience. An advocate of
the double nature proposal might suggest that many religious experiences which
are taken by those who have them to be experiences of the RR are such that
they can be construed either in a personal or in an impersonal way. Consider a
frequently reported religious experience: a sense of being guided in what one is
doing. Suppose that I believe that God is guiding me to pursue a career as a
teacher. How would the experiences that I take to involve God guiding me in
this way differ from the experiences I would have if, say, in deep reflection or
meditation I were to enter into a state in which I somehow or other participate
in an impersonal RR, and in which I see that I ought to pursue such a career?
Can some experiences be interpreted in either way? But it is important to note
that whatever the answer to these questions may be, the double nature proposal
does not rest on the plausibility of this suggestion about religious experience.
Second, while the double nature proposal provides a way to save much of
what both personalists and impersonalists assert, and while it concurs with the
Radical Pluralist view that certain apparently incompatible claims about the RR
actually are compatible, it does not provide a way of defending Radical Pluralism.
So the double nature proposal is a step in the direction of Radical Pluralism
rather than a defense of it. There are two respects in which it falls short of being
a defense of Radical Pluralism: it provides no support for the idea that the RR
can be, say, both a person and not a person. It also has been presented here
merely as a possibility, as a coherent proposal. Whether or not it is true is another
question. How might we set about determining whether or not the double nature
proposal is true? The merits of standard arguments for theism, as well as of any
arguments there are for the existence of the RR as conceived of impersonally,
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might be considered. A consideration of these arguments would include attention
to the extent to which religious experiences of different sorts provide support
for the different conceptions.
Third, religions do not differ solely with respect to their conceptions of the
RR, and insofar as they differ about the RR, their disagreements do not have
solely to do with whether or not the RR is personal. An appeal to the possibility
of a double nature may help to resolve some of these other disagreements, such
as disagreements between different personalists about the RR, as I suggested
above, and the same may hold for some disagreements between impersonalists
about the RR. But how many of the very large number of disagreements between
traditions admit of such a resolution? In how many cases can there be more than
one legitimate way of looking at things? For example, what about disagreements
about the afterlife: is there a single resurrection or are there a series of incarnations? What about disagreements between Christians and Muslims about the
status of Jesus, or between Hindus and Muslims about the status of the Qur'an?
It is not easy to see how the double nature proposal could help in such cases.
There seem to be disagreements in which it can tum out that both sides (or all
sides if there are more than two) are giving an accurate, if incomplete, description
of something. The substance of both sides can be preserved. Then there are other
cases where this is not so. It would be hard to say which type of disagreement
is more prevalent. But the fact that many disagreements seem not to admit of
the sort of resolution which is helpful in the case of the RR means that the double
nature proposal has a somewhat limited application. It is not that everyone can
be more or less right about everything. In many areas we will have to settle for
less, perhaps for saying that at most one view is correct, or for saying that the
lowest common denominator is correct, or for a compromise position where each
side gives up a lot but can hold on to some part of what it initially adhered to. 15
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NOTES
1. Theists disagree about whether or not God is a person. Christians generally believe that God is
a person, whereas Muslims generally believe that this is not so. (For an introduction to some relevant
issues see Gary Legenhausen "Is God a Person?" Religious Studies 22 (1986) 307-323.) But all
theists agree that God is personal in the respects specified above. When I say that God is personal
I mean just that God is like a person in such respects as these: God acts, responds to prayers,
rewards, punishes, forgives, cares for people,perceives, knows, makes moral judgments, and so
forth. and I want to avoid the controversial question of whether or not God actually is a person. In
what follows I assume, as it seems reasonable to assume, that it is coherent to attribute properties
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such as these to God. A personalist may of course believe without inconsistency that information
about God may be conveyed through the use of impersonal imagery and terminology. For example,
God is said by some to be light, by others to be a consuming fire. The appropriateness of using
impersonal terminology in describing a personal being should be clear from its constant occurrence
in discourse about human beings. This is just to recognize that information can be conveyed by the
use of terms which are functioning outside of their normal contexts.
2. Elsewhere Hick writes that "the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions
of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real or the Ultimate .... " (CRT 485)
3. In this paragraph and in the preceding one I concur with some points made by Harold A. Netland
in his interesting paper "Professor Hick on Religious Pluralism" Religious Studies 22, 249-61,
especially 252-53, 259. See also Dan Cohn-Sherbok "Ranking Religions" Religious Studies 22,
377-86, especially 379-82. Hick links the view that there are a variety of equally legitimate interpretations of the RR with the view that we have "cognitive freedom." The idea is that we are free to
make up our minds on certain important religious matters. That the RR has a certain nature, that a
particular group of theists has an accurate picture of it, are not conclusions which are forced on us.
In Hick's view, our experience is ambiguous with respect to whether or not there is an RR. Likewise,
according to Hick, whatever experience we have that is relevant to the nature of the RR is ambiguous:
there is room for a variety of interpretations, including interpretations which seem at odds with each
other.
4. Unpublished note by John Hick on this paper. See also his "Towards a Philosophy of Religious
Pluralism" in Religious Experience and Religious Belief: Essays in the Epistemology of Religion
Edited by Joseph Runzo& CraigK. Ihara(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987,99-116).
5. I say that this is true "for the most part" since Hick presumably allows that existence, for instance,
may correctly be imputed to the RR an sich, and he appears to think that the RR an sich is causally
related to us, and may correctly be described as such. I do not wish to exclude the possibility that
members of different faith communities would be in a position to declare that the RR an sich exists
or is causally connected to us. But the important point is that most of the uniquely Islamic beliefs
that Muslims have about Allah are beliefs about the Islamic conception of the RR, and not about
the RR an sich.
6. But even in recent work such as the essay referred to in n. 4, Hick's Noumenal Pluralism does
not always seem wholehearted. There he says that the various conceptions of the RR are valid (102,
113). Now "valid" here means something like "authentic," or "salvifically effective": the suggestion
that the various conceptions of the RR are all true, a suggestion that put in an occasional appearance
in earlier work, is not being made here. Yet at the end of that essay he writes that
it is clearly possible that [the various conceptions1 ... are not all equally adequate, but
that some mediate God to mankind better than others. Indeed it would be hard to maintainto take examples from the Judaic-Christian scriptures-that the images of God as a
bloodthirsty tribal deity urging the Israelites to slaughter their neighbours ... , and the
image of God conveyed in Jesus' parable of the prodigal son .... are equal in validity
or adequacy or value. [It] remains entirely possible that more adequate and less adequate
images of God operate within different religious traditions. (116)
It is hard to read such remarks and not find intimations of the idea that the images of the RR may
vary with respect to their truth or accuracy. This idea is suggested too by his usage of the term
"image" and by the examples he cites in explaining Noumenal Pluralism. For to say that a is an
image of b is to suggest, if not imply, that a resembles b, in which case we can have information
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about b's nature. And Hick's illustrations of the relation between the RR and the various conceptions
of it, such as his appeal to the fact that different people have different images of major historical
and religious figures, and his appeal to certain psychological cases and to information theory (l06ff.),
also strongly suggest that he has not disabused himself entirely of the idea that the conceptions of
the RR held by the various faith communities yield infonnation about the RR an sich. And if the
images are capable of being true, the question of whether or not Radical Pluralism is correct once
again raises its head. But the alternative reading, according to which talk of some images being
more "adequate" or more "valid" or "mediating God to mankind better than others" boils down (or
is it up?) to talk of salvific effectiveness, and has no implications for truth, cannot be ruled out
either. Hick may simply deny that he intends the term "image" to have its usual connotations, and
he may deny that the illustrations should be construed in the way I have suggested. (Incidentally,
in this passage Hick uses the term "God" in a much broader way than it is usually used: it's usage
is roughly equivalent to that of "RR" in this paper.)
7. I say a bit more about Hick's conception of salvation in section 4 of this paper.
8. I am aware that Hick would resist this conclusion. He writes in "Towards a Philosophy of
Religious Pluralism" that
God as experienced by this or that individual or group is real, not illusory; and yet the
experience of God is partial and is adapted to our human spiritual capacities. God as
humanly thought is not God an sich but God in relation to mankind, thought and experienced in terms of some particular limited tradition of religious awareness and response.
However, such remarks are not without their perplexities. For example, what does the claim that
God as experienced by Muslims is real amount to') The RR is certainly real, and insofar as a certain
faith community has a conception of, and is experiencing or engaging, the RR, they are experiencing
(etc.) something real. But Allah is not a separate entity over and above the RR. There are not as
many separate beings as there are images which are the product of interaction between the RR and
faith communities. On the Noumenal Pluralist view, it is true that those who worship Allah worship
a being that is real; but, to put it crudely, what is real about Allah is just the RR.
9. Nor will I raise the question of how we might decide if it is true. For reflection on this see
George Chryssides, "God and the Tao" (Religious Studies 19, 01-11); also William P. Alston
"Religious Experience and Religious Diversity," 2ff. (Unpublished).
10. Roger Trigg discusses what he takes to be a tendency to relativism in Hick's views in "Religion
and the Threat of Relativism," Religious Studies 19, 297-310, especially 299ff.
11. In another essay published about the same time as this one, however, Hick appears to qualify
this remark somewhat: ". . each of these ... traditions is so internally diverse that it is impossible
for human judgment to weigh them up and compare their merits as systems of salvation. It may be
that one facilitates human liberation/salvation more than the others; but if so this is not evident to
human vision." (CRT, 490; also GR, passim.) I suspect that the view expressed above in the text
is his considered opinion.
12. In this paragraph I take it for granted that Hick, at one point at least, thought the soteriological
test to be a test for truth. I am interested in defenses of Radical Pluralism, and since Hick does not
now hold that view, he now sees the soteriological test as having a different function; but the view
is worth mentioning, partly because while Hick does not now hold it, he did, and someone else
might. In the note referred on this paper referred to in n. 4, Hick writes that
[if], as seems to be the case, men and women, [in different traditions]. . show the
spiritual and ethical fruits of Reality-centeredness and love/compassion, we conclude that

398

Faith and Philosophy
[the conception of the RR of that tradition] is in soteriological alignment with the [RR]
. Ideas about the RR (as Jahweh, Allah, Brahman ... ) are true in the pragmatic
sense that they help to open human being[s] to the [RR] .

So Hick's view now seems to be that soteriology is a guide to effectiveness, but not to truth in the
correspondence sense of "true." Further questions about Hick's soteriological test are raised by
Netland, op. cit., 257-57.
13. For suggestions along these lines see Ian G. Barbour, Myths, Models & Paradigms (London:
SCM Press, 1974), 85.
14. Similar questions are raised in a somewhat different context by Thomas V. Morris in The Logic
of God Incarnate (Ithaca: Cornell, 1986). 34ff.
15. An earlier version of this paper was read to members of the faculty at Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia (National University of Malaysia) in July 1986. I am grateful for the comments I received
on that occasion. A later version was presented, in summary form, at the AAR (Midwestern Regional
Meetings) in April 1987. Work on this paper during the summer of 1987 was generously supported
by an NEH Summer Stipend. My thanks to Philip Devine and Robert Ennis for critical comments,
and to Hugh Chandler for helpful conversations.

